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In Children of Choice,' John Robertson argues for the primacy of
procreative liberty in decision-making about reproduction. Procreative
liberty is the freedom to decide whether or not to have offspring. The
primacy of procreative liberty means that debates about reproduction must
be resolved in favor of enhancing reproductive choice unless there is
excellent reason to believe that serious harm will result from the decision.
Robertson considers four categories of human activity that fall under the
rubric of reproductive choice: (1) avoiding reproduction (contraception and
abortion), (2) treating infertility, (3) controlling the quality of offspring, and
(4) using reproductive capacity for nonreproductive ends.2 In each of these
categories, Robertson points out six possible ethical problems: (1) interfer-
ence with nature, (2) respect for prenatal life, (3) welfare of offspring,
(4) impact on family, (5) effect on women, and (6) costs, access, and
consumer protection.
3
Given the scope of Robertson's work, this Article must necessarily be
selective. Although there may be feminist concerns about his approach to
the right to avoid reproduction, what he says with regard to that area is
relatively unproblematic, so I will concentrate on other areas. Likewise,
although feminists may worry about Robertson's positions on interference
* Professor of Philosophy, Wells College. B.A., San Jose State University; M.A.,
San Jose State University; Ph.D., Stanford University
1. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUC-
TIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994). A shorter version of this Article was originally presented at "A
Brave New World? Children of Choice in the Age of Reproductive Technology," a
symposium at the Frances Lewis Law Center of the Washington and Lee University School
of Law, in September 1994.
2. Id. at 6.
3. See id. at 12-15. There is, of course, some overlap in these categories.
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with nature, respect for prenatal life, possible impact on families, and costs,
access, and consumer protection, I will, for the most part, concentrate here
on welfare of offspring and effect on women.
Generally speaking, Robertson concedes that procreative liberty should
be limited by the harm principle;4 however, in practice, his stringent criteria
for harm rules out most restrictions. Robertson's worldview also seems
quite individualistic in the sense that procreative liberty is chiefly negative
and focuses on noninterference, even if some enabling legislation is assumed.
Robertson recognizes that unequal access to costly services is a problem, but
he does not press for welfare rights with respect to them.
Feminists will find a good deal to applaud in Children of Choice, but
many will also disagree with both his fundamental assumptions and his
treatment of specific issues. Although they will approve of Robertson's firm
convictions about some aspects of choice, they will question his narrow
conception of harm. Most will also be critical of the individualistic streak
that runs through his work, as it favors those with more power and
disadvantages those who, like white women and people of color, tend to
have less. Other more radical writers like Gena Corea, Helen Holmes, Ruth
Hubbard, Abby Lippman, and Christine Overall are highly critical of new
reproductive arrangements and technologies and, unlike Robertson, believe
that the burden of proof about their use should rest on the shoulders of those
who recommend them, not those who would limit their use.5 Thus, they will
deny the priority of procreative liberty
Femimsm is not a monolithic position, and I have considerable
sympathy for what Robertson has to say From my somewhat rough-hewn
utilitarian perspective, the high value that he places on freedom makes sense,
at least when it is coupled with a more broadly conceived harm principle.
Although utilitarianism differs in many respects from the classical liberalism
in which his view seems rooted, I believe that any plausible version of
utilitarianism must recognize how important freedom is for human
happiness.
4. The harm principle holds that the only reason for prohibiting acts is the risk of harm
to others.
5. See generally GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLO-
GIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS (1985); THE CUSTOM-MADE
CHILD? WOMEN-CENTERED PERSPECrIVEs (Helen B. Holmes et al. eds., 1981); RUTH
HUBBARD, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S BIOLOGY (1990); 1 MISCONCEPTIONS: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF CHOICE AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE AND GENETIC TECHNOLOGIES
(Gwynne Basen et al. eds., 1993); CHRISTINE OVERALL, ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION
(1987).
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None of this means that Robertson is completely "off the feminist
hook," however. My criticisms would alter both the course of his arguments
and some of his conclusions; they are offered here as friendly amendments
that, I believe, would strengthen his already powerful work. I will focus
primarily on assisted reproduction.
II. Procreation and the Self
My most general question about Robertson's views centers on his moral
theory He presents procreative liberty as a freestanding principle, limited
only by the harm principle. However, a clearer conception of how
procreative liberty fits within the larger theoretical context would be helpful
in evaluating the picture that he draws for us. Only such context could help
us understand more fully from whence arise the many subsidiary principles,
rules, and values necessary for fleshing out procreative liberty, including his
conception of what is to count as serious harm. These matters are pivotal for
an account of reproductive rights that is properly sensitive to gender and
other markers of disadvantage.
Robertson's defense of procreative liberty also raises questions. He
maintains that "control over whether one reproduces or not is central to
personal identity, to dignity, and to the meaning of one's life. "6 Women, he
rightly emphasizes, are especially burdened if society fails to recognize their
right not to reproduce.7 In addition, "being deprived of the ability to
reproduce prevents one from an experience that is central to individual
identity and meaning m life. "I
I agree that preventing the conception of children that you do not want
and having the children that you do want are central to human happiness and
that denying people the power to carry through on their choices about these
matters adds significantly to human misery But is it really such a good idea
to conceptualize the relationslup between childbearing status and one's core
self the way that Robertson does?
As things now stand, women are defined largely by their reproductive
status. Women who fail to bear children, or who bear them but fail to rear
them, are often seen as barren and inadequate. Anything that they achieve
is seen as mere compensation for their reproductive failure, and their failure
as women is defined as a failure to be fully human. Men are not defined by
6. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 24.
7 See id.
8. Id.
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their relationship to children in this way Men can be successful even if
they do not have children, although, if they do, they may be applauded for
being "good family men." Their fatherly status is not seen as crucial, and
no one thinks the less of great men if they do not have children.
Robertson's emphasis on the relationship of childbearing to identity
seems to assimilate (or recommend the assimilation of) men's experience
to that of women. One might want to argue that that is a good thing.
After all, men often feel less responsibility toward their children - to the
point of abandomng them altogether far more often than do women. If
men's parental status were more tightly woven into their core selves,
perhaps they would be more responsible fathers.
Is such identification necessary or sufficient for responsible parent-
hood? On the one hand, some people who make much of their parental
status are not particularly responsible parents. On the other hand, some
people for whom the status is a relatively unimportant part of their lives (or
is not socially recognized, like stepparents) can be excellent parents. More
broadly, having a cat by no means defines who I am, yet the distinctness
between me and my cat diminishes neither my responsibility for it nor my
sense of responsibility for it. Thus, there seems to be no reason for
believing that responsibility is tied to identity or that it ought to be.
Furthermore, there are good reasons for rejecting this model of the
self. First, it encourages people to care too much about their ability to
have children. Although women and men in the more privileged classes
in developed countries are now generally able to ensure that they will not
have children if they do not want them, there is no way to guarantee that
a particular individual will have children. If a person's whole self-concept
depends on having them, that person may be set up for devastating
disappointment.
The impact of such a model of the self is also differentiated by gender,
for women, because of their socialization - as well as continuing sexist
and pronatalist pressure - will be more likely to adopt this understanding
of the meaning of life without seriously questioning it. 9 Women, because
of their biologically more extensive role in reproduction, are also more
9. Thus, it is not true that I see any implied duty on the part of women to reproduce
ansing from this conception of procreation, as Robertson suggests in his response. See John
A. Robertson, Liberalism and the Limits of Procreative Liberty: Response to My Critics, 52
WASH. & LEE L. REV 233, 235 n.6 (1995). Rather, my point is merely that women are-more
likely to think that they have such a duty
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likely to bear the risks entailed by the assisted reproduction that might be
necessary to fulfill this conception of the self.
Second, this model of the self encourages people to see the decision
to have children primarily as a personal decision about themselves and not
as a moral decision affecting others. This moral dimension of childbearing
is obscured by the emphasis on self-creation, which makes it almost
impossible to discuss, let alone construct, moral standards. Thus, it is
hardly possible to talk about such matters as wrongful life or overpopula-
tion without seeming to violate the individual's most intimate self. '0
Feminists have been as guilty as anyone else in this area, in part
because of their quite reasonable fear that emphasis on the moral dimension
of reproduction will constitute yet another excuse for the imposition of
control over women. Robertson himself avoids many potential difficulties
by relying on something akin to Derek Parfit's widely accepted conclusion
that we do not harm future people by bearing them unless their lives would
be so miserable that they would prefer to be dead. ' This standard seems
to impose few limits because bearing a child who cannot be expected to
have a satisfying life is still assumed to be in the child's best interest.
I believe that this reasoning is flawed. Robertson might have noticed
that Parfit does not conclude that because we fail to harm individuals by
bringing them into adverse circumstances, we are thereby freed of
responsibility Instead, Parfit explores the feasibility of adopting a
different standard."2 In addition, embracing the moral minimalism implied
by Parfit's initial argument would lead to a great deal of unnecessary
misery It would be far better to adopt a more demanding moral standard
that required more of us, but from which we could also expect more care
and benefit. Many theorists, including feminists, have pointed out the
inconsistency of the pervasive minimalist approach, based as it is on an
unrealistically individualistic conception of human relationships." Because
10. A still more smister implication of this identification of child and self is evident in
Erin Conn's appeal for veto power over his wife's abortion. He pleads:
[A]fter that child is born, half of that child - part of that child is me. And I'm
part of that child. And I feel like by her having the right to abort that child is
her having the right to destroy a part of me without me having any say-so.
SUSAN BoRDo, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT: FEMINISM, WESTERN CULTURE, AND THE BODY 91
(1993) (quoting Nightline: Abortion Rights (ABC television broadcast, July 22, 1988)).
11. See generally DEREK PARFiT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984).
12. See id. at 443.
13. See, e.g., ALISON M. JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS AND HUMAN NATURE 40-41
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society does not - and cannot - really function according to the minimalist
approach, the illusion of a libertarian public life is maintained by an
officially invisible (and therefore unrewarded) base of work, mainly
volunteered by or, when necessary, extracted from women. 14
Given the high priority that he accords to the right to procreate,
Robertson's tight linking of the self with that right creates additional
problems. This constellation of values leads Robertson to view procreative
liberty as a justification for a variety of subsidiary rights of questionable
wisdom - rights to those things without which individuals would hesitate to
reproduce. 15
Robertson's conception of procreative liberty repeatedly leads him to
endorse extensive and far-reaching technologies intended to produce healthy
offspring. However, his professed principles seem insufficient to defend
such broad-ranging powers. He argues:
For many couples the decision whether to procreate depends on the ability
to have healthy children. Without some guarantee or protection against
the risk of handicapped children, they might not reproduce at all.
Thus viewed, quality control, devices become part of the liberty
interest in procreating or m avoiding procreation, and arguably should
receive the same degree of protection.
16
I have argued at length elsewhere that we owe it to our potential children not
to conceive them if they can be expected to have too low a quality of life; I
also believe that it is beneficial for people to be reassured that their fetuses
do not suffer from any known problems.' 7 There are reasons for seeing
these rights as much more limited than the ones that Robertson endorses.'
8
(1983).
14. For a somewhat more detailed discussion of the Parfit problem and the morality of
bringing impaired persons into the world, see generally Laura M. Purdy, Loving Future
People, in REPRODUCTION, ETHICS AND THE LAW (Joan Callahan ed., forthcoming 1995).
15. I use the word "individual" here, but Robertson's analysis seems to lean toward
couples. He argues at one point that single child-rearers might have less exclusive rights with
respect to children because of children's need for at least two child-rearers. See ROBERTSON,
supra note 1, at 134.
16. Id. at 33.
17 See generally L.M. Purdy, Genetic Diseases: Can Having Children Be Immoral?,
in GENETICS Now- ETHICAL ISSUES IN GENETIC RESEARCH 25 (John J. Buckley ed., 1978);
Laura M. Purdy, Genetics and Reproductive Risk: Can Having Children Be Immoral?, in
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS (Thomas A. Mappes & David DeGrazia eds.., 4th ed. forthcoming 1996);
Purdy, supra note 14.
18. This same constellation of principles leads Robertson to take a still more dubious
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One reason is that to avoid potential harm, a much more fine-gramed
analysis of the components of any right to healthy children is necessary
Another is that new reproductive technologies and arrangements may not be
the best way to ensure healthy children.
Robertson's rejection of most such challenges to the right to reproduce,
together with Is endorsement of subsidiary enabling rights, opens the door
to extensive genetic engineering. If couples have a right to healthy offspring
(otherwise they would not undertake the project at all), then how can they
be denied offspring of a desired sex, level of intelligence, or even hair color?
Although Robertson considers this question, 9 I do not think that his
treatment of it is adequate.
Many people think that it is possible to distinguish between morally
acceptable negative genetic engineering that eradicates defects and morally
dubious positive genetic engineering that enhances desirable traits. I believe
not only that it is by no means obvious how to justify that distinction, but
also that the distinction has less moral weight than is often supposed.
A great deal of resistance to positive engineering is probably rooted in
the assumption that any genetic tinkering is Nazi eugenics and, thus,
unthinkable. The rest probably comes from a variety of concerns about
interference with nature, responsibility for acts of commission (but not acts
of omission), and the like. Some of these worries are speculative, as
Robertson suggests,'" and could not be assuaged by any proposed safeguards,
no matter how carefully thought out. Some concerns, however, seem to me
to be quite realistic. They are based on justifiable caution about rushing
ahead in the face of obvious and significantly incomplete knowledge and on
the awareness of past disasters caused by enthusiasm for technological fixes,
sometimes pursued in the hopes of grandiose profits. These pedestrian but
nonetheless crucial concerns should be taken seriously, and they do provide
an additional check that should save us from the prospect of monkeying with
delicate biological mechanisms to achieve either trivial benefits (curly hair)
or characteristics of doubtful benefit to the child (extraordinary height).
position with respect to surrogacy. Robertson argues that persons who pay women to carry
a baby for them would be deterred from procreating if they could not be guaranteed that the
baby would be turned over to them at the end of the pregnancy. See ROBERTSON, supra note
1, at 131. However, it is not clear to me that this proposition is really true; but even if it were
true, it is not clear that it would be sufficient reason in all circumstances for requiring a
woman to give up a baby. Furthermore, this same reasoning could be used to justify a variety
of morally repellent restrictions on the surrogate mother.
19. See id. at 165-67
20. See id. at 162.
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Once again, although genetic and biological engineering is not intrinsically
wicked and could potentially - if pursued with all due caution - provide
substantial benefits, it seems doubtful that the overall welfare of society is
served by emphasizing genetic approaches at the expense of preventive
social programs.
Of course, we need to recognize that certain limits or costs will
discourage people from reproducing. However, it would be a mistake to
dismiss those limits too quickly or to raise the burden of proof against them
to such a level that they automatically become indefensible. Surely, if the
discouraging factors arise from other serious moral considerations, then
their effect on procreation must be analyzed with the knowledge that
carefully crafted trade-offs may be necessary Otherwise, procreative
liberty and its entourage become a moral bulldozer that crushes all
competing interests. It is difficult to see why procreative liberty should be
granted such priority
One should also note the selectivity of Robertson's application of the
principle that there is a prima facie right to that without which one would
be reluctant to procreate. First, he fails to take seriously the fact that the
kinds of regulations on the lives of pregnant women that he discusses"
would be sufficient to deter many women from going ahead with a
pregnancy Second, that principle plays havoc with the strict line that he
draws between the negative liberty to procreate and welfare rights that
would create more equal access to that liberty After all, lack of such
welfare rights prevents many people from taking advantage of expensive
methods of assisted reproduction. Still more notably, the absence of
welfare rights prevents people from having the number of children that
they want (by the usual methods) because they cannot afford them. Yet,
the services that would alleviate this problem are routine in other developed
Western nations. Why should the right to healthy children be limited to a
negative right to assisted reproduction when such goods as umversal access
to health care and a clean environment would protect fertility and improve
children's health?
In short, Robertson's justification of procreative liberty and what he
takes to be its implications needs further work. As it stands, his justifica-
tion will likely intensify the gender-based differential impact on women of
new reproductive possibilities. It is also likely to undermine the notion that
21. See id. at 173-94.
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childbearing is a moral activity, especially if it is paired with an almost no-
fault view of when it is permissible to conceive children.
III. Choice
Robertson chooses procreative liberty as the fundamental principle
governing reproductive conflicts, but there are good reasons for recogniz-
mg some form of self-determination as the more basic principle from which
procreative liberty is derived. Self-determination emphasizes control over
one's body and resources in a way that fits better with what I think are
plausible intuitions about the asymmetry between the right not to reproduce
and the right to reproduce.
Robertson sees the right not to reproduce and the right to reproduce
as two sides of the same coin. From that fact, he seems to infer that the
strong right not to reproduce implies an equally strong right to reproduce
and also that this strong right to reproduce provides as much support for
assisted reproduction as for so-called natural reproduction. Many
fenumsts would reject Robertson's position and would argue that because
the issues raised by assisted reproduction are so different from those raised
by natural reproduction, the former should be viewed with suspicion. Tins
position is reflected, for instance, in Christine Overall's recent claim that
"[tihe right not to reproduce is distinct from the right to reproduce. "If She
further distinguishes between weak and strong versions of each right. The
weak (liberty) sense of each involves noninterference; the strong (welfare)
sense involves access to services. Overall argues for both liberty and
welfare versions of the right not to reproduce and for the weak version of
the right to reproduce; she maintains that we should be "developing a
critical analysis of the ways in which the right to reproduce in the strong
sense is now being exercised."I
On the one hand, I think that Overall's distinction between the two
different rights is logically incoherent: As Robertson rightly sees, the right
to reproduce implies the right not to reproduce because the right to
reproduce is not a duty (that leaves one with no choice but to reproduce),
but is a right (that one is free to exercise or not as one wishes). On the
other hand, I agree with Overall's desire to draw a clearer line between
22. CHRISTiNE OvERALL, HUMAN REPRODUCTION: PRINCIPLES, PRACTICES, POLICIES
27 (1993).
23. Id. at 32.
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different types of reproduction than Robertson does.24 Unlike Overall and
other fermmst critics of assisted reproduction, I do not think that it calls for
a different burden of proof, but I do believe that realistic assessments of
possible harm require a much broader conception of harm and greater
alertness to potential harm than is evident in Robertson's work.
Overall and other femimsts focus on the questionable nature of the
choices that assisted reproduction provides women. Robertson
acknowledges their worries that men will use reproductive technologies to
control and oppress women, that assisted reproduction will reinforce the
problematic traditional identification of women with childbearing and
childrearing, and that women may be encouraged to undertake further
reproductive burdens to benefit men?5 He responds to these worries by
emphasizing the desirability of the new choices available to women and
underlines the safeguards for women implicit in a rights-based
framework.26
Robertson's comments about rights reflect femimst qualms about
rights as intrinsically individualistic and limited in scope, qualms that I do
not share: Rights are what we make of them, and we need not rely on them
to tell the whole moral story However, Robertson fails to do full justice
to feminst concerns. His first response is simply to point to examples, like
Norplant, that seem to offer new power and convemence to women. 27
Later, he concedes that "reproductive choices will not increase self-
determination for all women, because some will be pressured to make
choices that they previously would not have had to face, or will lack the
resources to take advantage of the opportunities presented."I However,
he concludes by saying that "[o]n balance, there is no reason to think
that women do not end up with more rather than less reproductive freedom
as a result of technological innovation."29 Consequently, he plumps for
promoting freedom, together with the safeguards necessary for limiting its
24. I have some qualms about the distinction because it is (1) relative to the accepted
standards of a giveil group and (2) the engine of much social misery in societies like the
United States that pour most of their efforts into negative rights at the expense of positive
ones.
25. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 228.
26. See id. at 229.
27 See id. It is not clear that using Norplant as an example really furthers Robertson's
case here. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
28. ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 231.
29. Id.
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burdens, rather than for wholesale prohibitions of certain techniques and
practices. He comments that "[e]ven in a world without the technological
options now available, recognition of negative procreative liberty would be
an important achievement."3 The implication here seems to be that
because procreative liberty is all of a piece, the price of recognizing the
right not to reproduce is that one accept an equally strong right to assisted
reproduction. That conclusion does not follow, however, because careful
application of the harm principle may seriously circumscribe the right to
assisted reproduction and leave the right not to reproduce untouched.
I believe that feminist concerns about assisted reproduction deserve a
closer look, and the controversy about choice provides a useful context for
doing so. What are the serious issues here? One problem that Robertson
seems not to recognize is that what start out as new options come to be
accepted as the standard of care, which women are not really free to
refuse. Second, women are quite likely to end up choosing options that are
not necessarily in their best interest. A third problem is-that although an
option may benefit a particular woman, it may harm others or women as
a class. Let us consider each of these issues in turn.
What about those new options that turn into obligations? Examples
are electronic fetal monitors and ultrasound, which are now routinely
accepted parts of prenatal care, despite the problems and potential risks
associated with them.31
There are other dangers here as well. One major source of danger is
society's tendency to subordinate women's interests to those attributed to
the fetus, as demonstrated by the disturbingly large number of prebirth
seizures, court-ordered treatments, and postbirth sanctions that women
have suffered." Enormous potential exists for compelling women to
undergo allegedly therapeutic treatments on behalf of fetuses, perhaps
including even in vitro fertilization (LVF) intended to establish that a given
30. Id.
31. See SUsAN SHERWIN, No LONGER PATIENT: FEMINIST ETHICS AND HEALTH CARE
119 (1992). Fetal monitors require that women in labor be still; they also lead to far more
cesarean sections than the equally safe human monitoring by nurses. See Laura M. Purdy, Are
Pregnant Women Fetal Containers?, 4 BIOETHICS 273, 282-84 (1990). Ultrasound now
appears to be safe, but it is being applied to developing fetuses and women without any solid
evidence of its long-term safety. See Elizabeth Bartholet, In Vitro Fertilization: The
Construction of Infertility and of Parenting, in ISSUES IN REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 253,
259 (Helen B. Holmes ed., 1994).
32. See Purdy, supra note 31, at 274.
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fetus is free of known defects. Worse still, fertile or pregnant women
might be subjected to extreme lifestyle restrictions thought to benefit
fetuses. 33
There is some tension in Robertson's views about these matters. On
the one hand, as we have seen, he repeatedly relies on a Parfit-like
argument about harm to future persons that severely limits the grounds
upon which such restrictions upon women might be based.34 On the other
hand, however, he seems quite open to the notion that women should be
held responsible for harm to their fetuses and quite critical of feminist
objections to current social trends that favor fetuses at the expense of
women.35 As I have argued elsewhere, it is plausible to believe that wide-
ranging preventive measures would eliminate all but a few of these
conflicts between woman and fetus. 36 Although Robertson recognizes the
point that prevention should precede any recourse to stronger measures, 37
he seems uncomfortably willing to envision coercive and punitive measures
even in the absence of prevention.3 He also invests the medical establish-
ment with more authority than it deserves on the basis of its track record.39
A second problem with Robertson's treatment of choice is that a
woman may choose an option that is not necessarily in her interest.
Nobody, of course, ever promised humans that freedom would bring with
it wisdom, but long-standing social patterns significantly raise the
probability that women, especially women disadvantaged by such other
characteristics as race, class, sexual orientation, or age, will find them-
selves making risky decisions in the absence of adequate information.
Because, for example, women are often considered less intelligent, less
33. Consider the now-ubiquitous signs warning pregnant women against drinking - at
the same time as treatment centers for substance abuse that accept pregnant women are
glaringly absent. On this and other perils, see id. at 286-88.
34. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
35. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 173, 190-94.
36. See Purdy, supra note 31, at 285-91.
37 See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 194.
38. Robertson, however, does recognize the disparity between the standards for invading
men's and women's bodies at present. He concludes that if we develop policies that invade
women's bodies for the benefit of fetuses, then we must be equally ready to require men to
undergo invasive procedures for the benefit of their children. See id. at 190-94.
39. For a very recent treatment of this subject, see generally EILEEN NECHAS & DENISE
FOLEY, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: WHAT You DON'T KNOW ABOUT How WOMEN ARE
MISTREATED BY THE MEDICAL COMMUNITY (1994).
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rational, or simply less important than similarly situated men, health care
providers may not take the time to ensure that their consent is informed and
truly voluntary I" Women may also receive information biased by a
provider's interest in providing profitable treatment, recruiting experimen-
tal subjects, or even, as with contract pregnancy, furthering a purely
commercial enterprise. Last, but certainly not least, crucial information
may simply be unavailable. This latter situation is especially problematic
when its absence is barely noticed, as when a new drug or technology is
firmly pronounced to be safe, despite the lack of data about long-term
effects. Such situations are especially dangerous because women are often
socialized to be relatively passive and because those who ask questions and
think for themselves tend to be categorized as difficult or demanding.
A third, closely related problem is that an option may benefit a
particular woman, but harm other women or harm women as a class.4' In
these kinds of cases, one woman may benefit from the exploitation of
another. Alternatively, a new option may function like a safety valve that
takes the pressure off individual women, but deflects attention from serious
underlying social problems; tlus latter situation reflects the fact that women
are, on balance, in a weaker bargaimng position than similarly situated
men. Women may then have recourse to practices that exploit other
women or perpetuate harmful stereotypes.
Why might women be in the weaker position? First, a woman's
education is still less likely than that of a man to have emphasized the kind
of analytic thinking required for dealing with these kinds of issues.42
Second, women are also more likely to have been socialized to be
agreeable and not to stand up for their own perceived interests. Third,
women may have more at stake in ensunng that there is an agreement at
all. After all, given the social perception of women as child-bearers and
40. A glance back at the history of medicine will remind those tempted to dismiss my
claims as paranoid that the issue is pressing. See generally MARY B. MAHOWALD, WOMEN
AND CHILDREN IN HEALTH CARE: AN UNEQUAL MAJORrrY (1993); NECHAs & FOLEY, supra
note 39.
41. See SHERWIN, supra note 31, at 132-36.
42. This assertion would have been more obviously true in the past when women were
denied higher education or were denied education altogether. However, there is ample
evidence that despite the apparently equal educational experience of girls and boys at present,
the sexism that was so overt earlier is still there in covert form. For a recent discussion of
this question, see generally MYRA SADKER & DAVID SADKER, FAILING AT FAIRNESS: How
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS CHEAT GIRLS (1994).
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nurturers, a woman is likely to feel especially insecure and inadequate if
it is she who is infertile. Even if it is not her fault, a couple's "barrenness"
is usually more of a liability for a woman. Helping a man fulfill the desire
for a genetically related child can be an important factor in keeping a
marriage together, and doing so may be important to a woman for both
emotional and economic reasons.4' In addition, as I pointed out earlier,
women are less likely to be adequately informed about the choices to be
made.' Consequently, women may be less able to determine what they
want and to hold out for it at the bargaining table. Yet, in many cases, it
is they who are most at risk, especially physically, from the proposed
procedures. These issues will disappear if sexism is eradicated; in the
meantime, they are ignored at women's peril.45
Many feminists believe that IVF and contract pregnancy are pressure
valves for particular women.' Women are themselves at risk from
inadequate information about what IVF entails, about possible long-term
consequences, and about success rates. Furthermore, they may be driven
to the procedure by the social devaluation of infertile women or by the
ethic that expects women always to subordinate their own interests in the
pursuit of others' goals.47 In addition, many (but not all) feminists believe
that women who contract to undertake a pregnancy for another do so only
because of their already compromised position as women.48 Perhaps the
$10,000 is almost irresistible, given women's inferior economic status, or
perhaps the exploitation here is more subtle - based, for example, on
43. It is tempting to look at infertility in isolation, but this context deeply affects the
lives of women at a time when men are more likely to remarry than women m case of divorce
and when women are often dependent on a man to achieve a decent standard of living. See
BARBARA R. BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 269 (1986). One must
remember that the average woman still earns only 70% of what a man earns, and that this
statistic hides much larger differences between particular women and men. See THE
AMERICAN WOMAN 1990-91. A STATUS REPORT tbl. 26 (Sara E. Rix ed., 1990).
44. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
45. We have already seen what unfairness results when decisions about the terms of
divorce are made as if women and men are on an equal footing m society. See generally
LENORE J. WErITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985).
46. See SHERWIN, supra note 31, at 134.
47 See generally Judith Lorber, Choice, Gift, or Patriarchal Bargain? Women's
Consent to In Vitro Fertilization in Male Infertility, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL
ETHICS 169 (Helen B. Holmes & Laura M. Purdy eds., 1992).
48. See, e.g., OVERALL, supra note 5, at 120.
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guilty feelings about a past abortion. Those feminists point out that the
wives of men who seek contract pregnancy are in a weak position and
cannot resist because it is the wives' own inadequacy as child-bearers that
the contract pregnancy offsets.4 9 They also maintain that contract
pregnancies harm women as a class because the contract reinforces the
view that women are merely child-bearers and nurturers, not equal
participants m human affairs who may or may not engage in procreation.5"
A central problem for both IVF and contract pregnancy is the
possibility that things will go awry and that either no one will take
responsibility for genetic materials or for a baby, or too many will want
control over them. The latter situation can arise when people seek to
escape previously agreed-upon responsibility or when they want
responsibility that they earlier renounced. The kinds of femimst concerns
described earlier raise questions about Robertson's hard-line solution that
participants in assisted and collaborative reproduction must make binding
commitments about what they will do.5 In principle, this is an attractive
solution. However, it is less appealing if the parties are not in an equal
bargaining position. As I have argued, women are typically the disadvan-
taged parties, 52 although a given man, of course, may be in the weaker
position.
As Robertson and some feminists recognize,53 the rub is that using
such reasons to deny women the standing to engage in decision-making
about reproduction seems equally as bad as ignoring the obvious disparities
between women and men. Denying that standing undermines women's
legal personhood and invites paternalistic intrusion into women's lives. In
short, there are serious risks in both paths. These risks result from the
relentless sexism in society - sexism that will sully any solution. The
only safe course, therefore, would be to eradicate sexism before we do
anything else. Although eradicating sexism is an urgent task, we cannot
stop the world until tlus task is completed. The question becomes what to
do until then.
49. See d. at 118.
50. See d. at 122.
51. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 126, 131.
52. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
53. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 132. See generally Christine T. Sistare,
Reproductive Freedom and Women's Freedom: Surrogacy and Autonomy, 19 PHIL. F 227
(1988).
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In the case of IVF, of course, there are other reasons for doubting the
wisdom of the path that society is currently pursuing. On the one hand,
success rates are low, probably much lower than most women engaged in
IVF fully realize.-A On the other hand, the procedures involve some known
risks, as well as yet-unknown risks for both woman and child.55 Under
these circumstances, one must ask yet again whether expanding IVF
programs is a good policy The answer here surely must be that it is not.
The underlying problem here, it seems to me, is that our society is
based upon a relatively unregulated free market - a market that produces
expensive, high-tech treatments for some, while others suffer from similar
problems that a more equal distribution of resources could easily prevent.
Although Robertson seems concerned about problems of access, he does
not really address this issue at the most basic level. It seems to me that the
failure to do so creates serious questions about some of his solutions, as
well as about his support for assisted reproduction.
If one accepts the inegalitarian status quo, it is quite reasonable to
argue, as does Robertson, that it would be unjustifiable to limit how those
with money can spend it. After all, no one stops them from spending it on
vacation homes or yachts, so why should they not use it to attempt to
produce a genetically related child? How might one respond to this
argument? Some have argued that the emphasis on genetically related
children erroneously promotes the notion that such children are especially
valuable.56 Of course, most people do not think that that notion is
erroneous, and they seem to want their "own" children very much. Thus,
even if the desire for genetically related children is morally questionable,
it is important to recognize that unless education persuades people
otherwise, there will continue to be much demand for them.
It would be easier to resolve this issue if the resources allocated to IVF
could easily be channeled to the prevention of infertility or to some other
equally good cause, but resource allocation is, of course, more complicated
than that. Worse still, relatively few people seem troubled by the
knowledge that a more egalitarian system of resource allocation would
prevent a good deal of misery; therefore, arguing for more equal allocation
of resources does not make much difference politically
54. See SHERWIN, supra note 31, at 129.
55. See id.
56. Cf. OVERALL, supra note 5, at 131.
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Is there, nonetheless, a moral argument to be made here that the
United States ought to de-emphasize high-tech approaches to infertility like
IVF and instead ought to promote basic social improvements? Given a free
market economy, that change would not happen without a lot of political
support, yet democratic decision-making can exert some control over how,
and even whether, some technologies will be developed - consider the
supersonic transport and the supercollider.
IVF tends to be offered in freestanding clinics on a fee-for-service
basis. Does the existence of these climcs threaten more basic services? At
first blush, the answer appears to be no. However, a look at the broader
context suggests that the answer may not be quite so clear. Medical
resources, after all, are limited, and educational programs, personnel,
buildings, and other resources allocated to IVF cannot be used in other
ways. Thus, unless other pressing health care needs are already being met
(and we know that they are not), devoting resources to IVF does change
the services available. In that case, training people to do IVF and setting
up climcs are not just a matter of letting the wealthy decide how to use
their disposable income.
Even among feminists, there is an active debate about IVF; some
claim that reducing its use is to abandon unfairly the infertile,57 and others
claim that women's strong desire for babies is at least in part a noxious
social construction." This way of framing the debate, however, isolates
it from the larger social context. There seems to be good reason to suspect
that remediable social factors are implicated in rates of infertility
Addressing the social factors directly would likely prevent many cases of
infertility De-emphasizing IVF to concentrate instead on those social
factors is therefore not to abandon infertile women, but rather to take a
different approach to the problem. Already infertile women may lose out,
but those who would have become infertile due to social factors would
benefit. The current approach allows infertility to develop in many
women, but promises the rmxed blessing of IVF only to those few who can
pay for it. Furthermore, judicious use of other methods, like education,
57 Cf. Michelle Stanworth, Birth Pangs: Conceptive Technologies and the Threat to
Motherhood, in CoNFLucrs IN FEMINISM 288, 293-96 (Marianne Hirsch & Evelyn F Keller
eds., 1990).
58. See CoREA, supra note 5, at 220. See generally PRONATALiSM: THE MYTH OF MOM
AND APPLE Pm (Ellen Peck & Judith Senderowitz eds., 1974).
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child-sharing of various kinds, adoption, or contract pregnancy, could help
satisfy the already infertile.
Contract pregnancy is itself a seriously contested issue, both in the
femimst community and outside it, although for different reasons. Many
feminists argue that it is just the sort of debilitating choice that should not
be available.5 9 I have argued against this position at length elsewhere,'
where I maintained that a carefully regulated version of the practice
potentially empowers white, heterosexual women and members of other
disadvantaged groups, such as lesbian and gay couples.6
I believe that these kinds of cases demonstrate that neither a sweeping
principle of procreative liberty nor a fearful elimination of worrisome
options should determine what liberties are justifiable. Instead, we need
an issue-by-issue discussion that keeps in mind the value of individual
freedom, but that is also constantly mindful of potential harms created by
the sexist context in which decisions are being made.
IV Harm
Freedom is an important value, and it cannot be exercised unless those
who would limit freedom in the name of harm are pressed to name clear,
specific, and weighty concerns. The problem is to determine which threats
meet those criteria.
59. See OVERALL, supra note 5, at 111-31.
60. See generally Laura M. Purdy, Another Look at Contract Pregnancy, in IssuEs IN
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 303 [hereinafter Purdy, Another Look]; Laura
M. Purdy, Surrogate Mothering: Exploitation or Empowerment?, 3 BIOETHiCS 18 (1989)
[hereinafter Purdy, Surrogate Mothering].
61. Further detail is beyond the scope of this Article, but I do have some qualms about
Robertson's hard-nosed approach to binding commitments in such matters, as I suggested
earlier. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Like many others, I cringe at the idea of
a baby torn from a mother's arms, even though that is an appeal to emotion rather than to
moral principle. I must say that I find it difficult to adjudicate between the forceful feminist
arguments in favor of an escape clause for women undertaking contract pregnancy and the
similarly forceful arguments offered by Robertson on tls issue. See ROBERTSON, supra note
1, at 125-27 My inclination at present is to think that this is one of the areas in which it is
necessary to pay special attention to women's experience in giving birth because it seems to
change one's perspective so radically. As a woman who has never given birth, it may be
impossible for me to make an informed and fair judgment. Naturally, that line of reasoning
rules out men as well. It may be that the best that those of us in this position can do is to let
those who have given birth argue the issue among themselves, as we participate only to the
extent of analyzing the arguments for the usual kinds of fallacies.
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There are always reasons for rejecting new social arrangements and
technologies. Knee-jerk rejection leads to paralysis and a mind-set that
clings to tradition and that fails, often enough, to notice the harm caused
by doing things the usual way History is rife with dire warnings of vague
horrors that never came to pass or that, if they did, turned out to be
benefits in disguise.6' Unfortunately, some miraculous innovations that
promised only good things have turned into major scourges - consider
how the automobile strangles cities and how television can deaden minds.
If people had predicted these outcomes, Robertson might well have
described their warnings as remote and speculative, yet they would have
been quite accurate.
Today, researchers and physicians are barreling ahead, following grant
money and promises of profit wherever they lead, and devoting relatively
little thought to the full context of their decisions - all in the name of
choices for women.63 However, the rhetoric of choice would be more
convincing if the medical establishment had a better record on women's
welfare.
62. Consider, for instance, the allegedly disastrous consequences predicted for
contraception by Pope Paul VI, see POPE PAUL VI, ON THE REGULATION OF BIRTH:
HUMANAE VITAE 11-12 (1968), or the absurd theories of nineteenth-century physician Edward
H. Clarke about women's education, see generally EDWARD H. CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION;
OR, A FAIR CHANCE FOR GmLs (1874).
63. Susan Bordo puts the matter nicely m the following comment on the situation:
[I]n general, the New Reproductive Technology has been a confusingly mixed
bag as far as the subjectivity of women is concerned. On the one hand, women
now have a booming technology seemingly focused on fulfilling their desires:
to conceive, to prevent miscarriage, to deliver a healthy baby at term. On the
other hand, proponents and practitioners continually encourage women to treat
their bodies as passive instruments of those goals, ready and willing, "if they
want a child badly enough," to endure however complicated and invasive a
regime of diagnostic testing, daily monitoring, injections, and operative
procedures may be required. Thus, one element of women's subjectivity is
indeed nurtured, while all other elements (investment in career, other emotional
needs, importance of other personal relationships, etc.) are minimized,
marginalized, and (when they refuse to be repressed) made an occasion for guilt
and self-questioning.
[In short, i]n our present cultural context, the New Reproductive Technolo-
gies do cater to women's desires (that is, to the desires of women who can
afford them), but only when they are the right desires, desires that will
subordinate all else (even in the face of technological success rates which
continue to be very discouraging) to the project of producing a child.
BoRDo, supra note 10, at 86-87
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My own eyes began to be opened some fifteen years ago by Gena
Corea's ground-breaking Hidden Malpractice.'4 Periodic reassessments of
the situation suggest that the health care system has yet to face fully the
devaluation of women's interests that was then so prevalent.65 Only
recently have the inadequacies in the health care system burst upon the
wider political scene.
Not only do many people lack access to any decent care, but subtler
inequities also exist. White women and members of other disadvantaged
groups systematically receive worse treatment and care than white, muddle-
class, heterosexual men.6 Bioethics, the academic discipline that takes the
health care establishment as its subject, has been remarkably slow to notice
these facts. In particular, bioethics has been wary of feminist work and has
mostly relegated it to the Siberian margins of the field by ignoring its
concerns or dismissing them as "political."67
In bioethics, as in the health care system itself, women's interests are
routinely discounted or ignored altogether. Sexism has been most apparent
in reproductive matters; for example, a great deal of research and debate
on abortion still proceeds without any reference to women's concerns. In
addition, when the new reproductive technologies began to appear about
fifteen years ago, their possible detrimental impact on women seemed to
be of no concern to anyone.68 Even now, the mainstream debate seldom
takes seriously the issues raised by the feminist literature. Recent feminst
work documents and analyzes this phenomenon.69
64. GENA COREA, THE HIDDEN MALPRACTICE: How AMERICAN MEDICINE TREATS
WOMEN AS PATIENTS AND PROFESSIONALS (1977).
65. See generally GENA COREA, THE INVISIBLE EPIDEMIC: THE STORY OF WOMEN AND
AIDS (1992); MAHOWALD, supra note 40; JOHN M. SMITH, WOMEN AND DOCTORS (1992);
Joan M. Altekruse & Sue V Rosser, Feminism and Medicine: Co-optation or Cooperation?,
in THE KNOWLEDGE EXPLOSION: GENERATIONS OF FEMINIST SCHOLARSHIP 27 (Cheris
Kramarae & Dale Spender eds., 1992).
66. See generally COREA, supra note 65; MAHOWALD, supra note 40; NECHAS &
FOLEY, supra note 39; SMITH, supra note 65.
67 For a refutation of this charge, see generally Laura M. Purdy, Good Bioethics Must
Be Feminist Bioethics, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES IN BIOETHICS (Wayne Sumner &
Joseph Boyle eds., forthcoming). For further evidence, see generally FEMST PERSPECTIVES
IN MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 47; SHERWIN, supra note 31.
68. See generally Laura M. Purdy, The Morality of New Reproductive Technologies, 18
J. Soc. PHIL. 38 (1987).
69. See generally FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 47;
SHERWIN, supra note 31. There are also quite a few articles on specific topics written from
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As both feminism and bioethics mature, feminists are loolng beyond
reproduction, not only at other specific issues in bioethics, but also at the
field as a whole. Why does bioethics seem blind to sexism in medicine?
For example, where was bioethics before it became common knowledge
that medical research often fails to include women and that it concentrates
on problems that plague men?7' How could we have been so oblivious to
the gender differences in physician/patient relationships, differences that
lead doctors to suppose that women need tranquilizers when the same
symptoms m a man suggest the need for a heart workup?71 Why are men's
vievs about withdrawal of care so much more likely to be taken
seriously9'T Why, too, has it taken so long for bioethics to notice the
occasions when allocation decisions leave women providing the brunt of
the care?73 And so on.
As the magnitude and pervasiveness of such gender differentials come
into focus, feminist philosophers have also started to analyze the overall
structure of bioethics. Many are coming to suspect, as Susan Sherwin
argues, that "the organization of bioethics reflects the power structures that
are inherent in the health care field, which, in turn, reflect the power
a feminist point of view; for the most part, they are still sprinkled here and there in the
literature. See generally Christine Overall, New Reproductive Technology: Some Implications
for the Abortion Issue, 19 J. VALUE INQUIRY 279 (1985); Susan Sherwin, Feminist Ethics and
In Vitro Fertilization, in SCIENCE, MORAL=rY AND FEMINIST THEORY 265 (Marsha Hanen &
Kai Nielson eds., 1987); Caroline Whitheck, The Moral Implications of Regarding Women as
People: New Perspectives on Pregnancy and Personhood, in ABORTION AND THE STATUS OF
THE FETUS 247 (William B. Bondeson et al. eds., 1983). Hypatia is the primary journal for
feminist philosophy, and it occasionally publishes articles in bioethics. Issues in Reproductive
Technologies, see supra note 31, is largely femtnst, and two additional anthologies of feminmst
work will appear in 1995: FEMINISM AND BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION (Susan M.
Wolf ed., forthcoming 1995); REPRODUCTION, ETHICS AND THE LAW, supra note 14.
70. See generally Sue V Rosser, Re-Vistoning Clinical Research: Gender and the Ethics
of Experimental Design, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 47, at
127
71. For a recent eye-opening look at the medical establishment, especially gynecology
and obstetrics, see generally SMITH, supra note 65. John M. Smith cites a 1990 American
Medical Association report entitled Gender Disparities in Clinical Dectsion-Making, which
notes significant gender differences in such critical matters as kidney transplants, cardiac
catheterization, and diagnosis of lung cancer. See id. at 14.
72. See generally Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right
to Die," 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 85 (1990).
73. See generally Virgima L. Warren, Feminist Directions in Medical Ethics, in
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 47, at 32.
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structures of the larger society "I It hardly bears repeating that despite
considerable progress for women in recent years, men - mostly white,
middle-class, heterosexual men - are still in charge (both in society
generally and in the medical profession particularly) and consciously or
subconsciously choose social arrangements that reflect their perceived
interests. Worse still, individual practitioners may still be gripped by
common sexist, even misogynist, attitudes for which medical education
currently provides no antidote.75
The results for white women and members of other less powerful
groups can be devastating. Sexist health care, for example, can rob us of
physicians' respect, deprive us of safe and effective therapies, deny us the
kind of birtung experiences that we value, drug us into resignation to life's
injustices, legitimize violence toward us, and even undermine our last
wishes about how to die. Consequently, we may be deprived of the kind
of control over our lives that men take for granted. Although some writers
question the value of such control,76 it is essential for the welfare of
second-class citizens in societies in which there is little support for positive
rights.
The biases built into medicine and bioethics mean that it is unwise to
take much at face value. For instance, Robertson points to Norplant to
show how technology can make women's lives better. However, feminists
are much less quick to rely on assurances of safety or efficacy from an
establishment that gave us the pill, diethylstilbestrol (DES), and the Dalkon
Shield. Despite assurances to the contrary, Norplant is still an experinen-
tal drug whose long-term effects are as yet unknown. Norplant also
increases women's dependency on medical professionals. Obviously, such
dependency cannot be helped sometimes, but it seems important both that
no unnecessary dependency be created and that any necessary dependency
be accompanied by vivid awareness of its possible dangers. Thus, the
dependency engendered by Norplant is doubly worrisome because it can
74. SHERWIN, supra note 31, at 3.
75. This is a point repeatedly emphasized by John M. Smith. See generally SMITH,
supra note 65.
76. Doubts about the value of control are to be found in the literature on ecofemism.
For discussions of control within the more general context of ethics and of control's
ramifications for bioethics, see generally DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF
-LIFE: LIVING wrrH MORTALITY (1993).
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lead to paternalistic refusals to remove it. Norplant's characteristics also
lend themselves to potentially more sinister uses.'
Yet another issue raised by the Norplant example is the piecemeal
approach common m bioethics. Sexism and other discriminatory practices
are harder to detect and to keep consistently in mind when one sees
bioethics as a set of separate issues. Children of Choice is a salutary new
effort at placing reproductive issues m the unifying context of a basic moral
and legal framework, but Robertson is not always successful at forging the
necessary links. In the case of Norplant, he emphasizes its convenience
and effectiveness.78 However, attention to its possible side effects and their
significance for women's lives mght reasonably lead one both to reevaluate
Norplant's convemence79 and to question the entire rationale for its use.
Surely, one major concern about contraceptives that emphasize
convenience, like Norplant, is that such contraceptives encourage women
to rely on them without thinking about whether they need to take steps to
protect themselves from serious sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) like
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). The answer is not
necessarily to withhold such methods; rather, it would make sense to
77 See Anita Hardon, Norplant: Conflicting Views on Its Safety and Acceptability, in
ISSUES IN REPRODUCrIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 11, 15. See generally Hilde L.
Nelson & James L. Nelson, Other Vsms" Aren't Enough: Femnism, Social Policy and Long-
Acting Contraception, in THE ETHICS OF LONG-TERM CONTRACEPTION: GUIDELINES FOR
PUBLIC POLICY (Ellen Moskowitz ed., forthcoming).
78. See ROBERTSON, supra note 1, at 69-70.
79. See, e.g., Hardon, supra note 77, at 16-17, 22-24. Anita Hardon writes: "Mhe
researchers tend to define disorders such as headaches, dizziness, and weight gain as minor
side effects, of which the relationship with Norplant has not been proven." Id. at 23.
However, anyone who suffers from such problems knows that they can be far from minor,
especially in a society in which women are expected to be cheerful and thin m order to
maintain their jobs and their personal relationships. Still more worrisome is the following
comment:
With respect to Norplant, it is remarkable that so little has been written about
the consequences of menstrual disturbances for the day-to-day life of the users.
Anthropological research suggests that such consequences can be far-reaching.
Menstruation is an important event in any woman's life. The meaning that is
attributed to tlus event or its loss vanes, affecting, among other things, cooking
procedure, sexual interaction, and religious practices. [M]enstrual blood
is often perceived to be a dangerous element for men.
Delay or absence of menstruation m many societies is considered unhealthy
for wom[e]n.
Id. at 23-24 (citations omitted).
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downplay the pleasures of convenience and to emphasize the importance -
in all but the most solidly monogamous sexual relationship - of using
condoms as well. That women are so much more at risk of contracting
AIDS from heterosexual relationships than men simply reinforces this
fundamental point."0
In short, taking seriously the sexist context in which assisted
reproduction occurs means that the potential harm to women is much more
immediate and serious than most people are willing to acknowledge. The
evidence for a femimst perspective that recognizes the potential for such
harm is compelling, but it is not, on the whole, part of the accepted public
knowledge. Rather, the fenmist perspective must be sought out, and those
who incorporate it in their work must be willing to face the charge of
having "politicized" the debate."1 As I suggested earlier, none of this
means that assisted reproduction should automatically be ruled out; rather,
its methods should be examined on an issue-by-issue basis with scrupulous
attention to feminist objections.Y Robertson is more sensitive to feminist
concerns than most mainstream writers, but I believe that he would be even
more effective if he took the literature more seriously
There is a yet more fundamental criticism of the emphasis on the
provision of assisted reproduction, however. Sexism is not the only
dubious ethical tendency to which our society is prone. I have been guilty,
like Robertson and so many others, of focusing on the novel, the exciting,
and the bizarre. Naturally, it is imperative to attempt to evaluate new
technologies because they are coming at us so quickly, and it is fun to think
of reasons for rejecting what so often seems like silly opposition to bright
new possibilities. However, it is all too easy to get drawn into this
technological wonderland and to lose our grounding in the real world of
limited resources and pervasive discrimination. The situation reminds me
of plans to create space colomes to escape a polluted and worn-out earth;
when we examine the issues realistically, it seems far more sensible to
nurture the earth instead. Similar reasoning applies here. Many of the
80. See generally A. Nicolosi, Mechanismr di trasnussione e nschio di mnfeztone da virus
dell'immunodeficienza acquista (HIV-1), 96 L'IGIENE MODERNA 556 (1991).
81. Susan Sherwin provides an excellent introduction and compilation of the studies.
See generally SHERWIN, supra note 31. For a discussion of "politicization," see Laura M.
Purdy, Politics and the College Curriculum, in NEUTRALITY AND THE ACADEMIC ETHIC 236,
248-56 (Robert L. Simon ed., 1994). See generally Purdy, supra note 67
82. See generally Purdy, Another Look, supra note 60; Purdy, supra note 14; Purdy,
Surrogate Mothering, supra note 60.
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alleged benefits of assisted reproduction could be achieved more efficiently
and more equitably by revamping familiar social arrangements.
.So what is the attraction of high-tech proposals? I believe that such
proposals feed a land of escapism that both arises from and helps
perpetuate a number of intellectual, moral, and political tendencies
pervasive in our society, tendencies connected with our disinterest in what
Virginia Warren calls "housekeeping issues."' Housekeeping issues
involve ongoing situations, unlike crisis issues that can provide the
satisfaction of being resolved once and for all. 4 Housekeeping issues,
unlike dramatic crisis issues, seem trivial, yet housekeeping issues require
us to rethink big chunks of our lives: "our character traits, how we think
about ourselves, and how we relate to others."I In addition, housekeeping
issues call upon a variety of intellectual and moral resources beyond those
that we consider usual. Because of the appeal of tackling crisis issues,
much of the applied ethics establishment has fallen into a sort of "crisis of
the month" mentality by leaping from one problem to another without
stopping to think about how those problems might be related or what might
prevent them. As a result, we are drawn to stopgap solutions that are often
shortsighted, authoritarian, or punitive; technological fixes tend to look
better than fundamental social change. However, unless we face the
ongoing, systematic problems in our social arrangements, new versions of
old problems will arise to replace those that we think that we have solved.
How might these realizations change our perception of assisted
reproduction? Well, if infertility is such a problem, would it not make
more sense to investigate and eradicate its causes and to concentrate on
environmental toxins, STDs, iatrogemcity, and social patterns that require
women to conceive later in life if they want both family and career 9
Addressing these moral and political issues not only would be likely to be
far more successful and less risky to women and babies than new high-tech
interventions, but also would have positive "side effects" on all of our
lives. For example, everyone would benefit from a cleaner environment,
better public health, and the land of social equality that values equal
consideration of the interests of all persons.
This approach would look less daunting if the true costs of high-tech
solutions were factored into decisions about how to deal with the problems.
83. Warren, supra note 73, at 36.
84. See id. at 37
85. Id.
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For example, because of unwarranted technological optimism and the
sexism or racism that fails to take seriously potential or real harms to
members of disadvantaged groups, evaluations of high-tech solutions often
underplay or fail to mention altogether the tenuous benefits and high,
socially skewed costs that they involve. Thus, the facts that IVF has
extremely low success rates, is expensive, and puts women through a
strenuous cycle of drugs and surgical interventions do not really count
against IVF when policy decisions are being made. 6 Little attention is paid
either to the risks for women or to their distasteful experiences during the
therapy 87 As Sherwin points out, "[t]o date, only feminists have raised
these issues. "88
The same kinds of issues could be raised with respect to the health of
fetuses and babies. I too have been guilty of focusing on the problem of
genetic disease in isolation. However, looking at genetic disease and other
risk factors in the larger context has convinced me that it is unreasonable
to concentrate on possible genetic approaches to health before addressing
the social factors that so seriously affect permatal morbidity and mortality
According to a government task force, "if we just delivered routine clinical
care and social services to pregnant women, we could prevent one-quarter
86. For a list of IVF's possible dangers, see COREA, supra note 5, at 148-50.
87 See SHERWIN, supra note 31, at 125. Susan Sherwin argues:
The bioethics literature has not considered the chemical similarities between
clomid, an artificial hormone that is commonly used to increase women's rate
of ovulation, and DES, a drug that has belatedly been implicated as carcmogemc
for the offspring of women who were prescribed it decades before. The
uncertainties surrounding superovulation and use of ultrasound and the dangers
associated with adminstering a general anesthetic for egg collection and embryo
transfer have not been deemed worthy of attention in the nonfemmist bioethics
literature. Women who do succeed in achieving and sustaimng pregnancies
through this method experience a very high rate of surgical births, but those
risks also are generally ignored. Furthermore, most ethical discussions do not
explore the significant emotional costs for women that are associated with this
therapy
Id. (footnotes omitted). Paul Lauritzen provides a description of the process of infertility
workups and attempts at a technological fix, as well as an example of a woman undertaking
the risk of IVF because of a man's infertility See Paul Lauritzen, What Price Parenthood?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 38, 38-39; see also Lorber, supra note 47, at
169. For an analysis of the differing views of the enterprise, see generally Lene Koch, The
Fairy Tale as Model for Women's Experience of In Vitro Fertilization, In ISSUES IN
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY, supra note 31, at 275.
88. SHERWIN, supra note 31, at 125.
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to one-third of infant mortality "9 Children's health could be still further
ameliorated by a variety of policies such as guaranteed health care, clean
environments, more liberal parental leaves, and better nutrition programs
for the poor. The social choices now being made about improving
permatal health are especially troubling given their racist and sexist
implications, for if poor black women did not have to live in such
miserable conditions there would be far fewer dead, disabled, or sick
babies. It is difficult to feel much enthusiasm for the Human Genome
Project or spectacular new experimental therapies when the remedies for
many problems now facing women and children are so close at hand.
It seems clear that we cannot "have it all." We seem to be faced with
a choice. Either we push ahead with high-tech solutions and thereby
ignore the ongoing social problems that play a substantial part in creating
them, or we concentrate on ameliorating the social problems and thereby
de-emphasize possible high-tech solutions, including the enticing
nonprocreative uses of reproduction. Following either path means that
some needs will not be met. Of course, there is no reason for approaching
this issue in a completely all-or-nothing fashion. Indeed, I suspect that a
primary emphasis on basic social problems, together with a limited and
carefully thought-out program of technological innovation, would be the
optimum approach.
The questions that face us in this context are similar to the allocation
questions common in the rest of the health care system and, indeed, in
society at large. The special twist here is the potential for harm to white
women and members of other groups. The more cautious path that I
advocate bypasses those harms and begins to address age-old problems of
inequality
V Conclusion
Thus, procreative liberty's emphasis on assisted reproduction is all
very well: The shivers that it elicits in those who worship tradition,
predicate the personhood of embryos, or fear the unknown may be
groundless. When we look at the overall social context, however, funding
some of the more exotic proposals cannot compete morally with the need
for providing basic necessities like health care, nutritious food, decent
shelter, education, jobs, and a clean environment for all. This is not an
89. BoRDo, supra note 10, at 84.
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argument for banmng the more exotic approaches, but rather for more
careful and selective encouragement or discouragement of particular
options.
If we let these high-tech approaches flourish, it will come at the
expense of these more basic approaches to human well-being. We could
thus create a society m which some people enjoy a wide range of choices,
even if those possibilities do not necessarily enhance their own welfare.
Alternatively, we could work toward a society that attempts to achieve a
far more fundamental and widespread kind of well-being. I believe that
justice requires us to choose the latter course.
